„As-salam alaykum (...) Ko tātou, tātou“
Jacinda Ardern’s Strategy of Solidarity after the Christchurch Attacks

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Notes on the Text

• Jacinda Ardern has made a clear point by leaving the perpetrator unnamed and, by that, denying him the notoriety that he sought through the attacks. She also asked media and the public to do the same. He will therefore remain anonymous in this thesis as well.

• Because the first two speeches analysed with MAXQDA were Word documents, while the last three are in a WebCollector format, the first two have enumerated paragraphs, while the last three are organised into pages. The references for Sp.01 and Sp.01-2 will therefore be e.g. "Sp.01: 4-5" meaning paragraph 4 to 5, and the references for Sp.02 – Sp.04 will refer to pages (1-3).

• The reactions outlined in Chapter 5 have been coded, but not analysed with MAXQDA. They are enumerated and referred to as R.01,02 etc and the page number (e.g. R.01: 2). The appendix lists only those documents used in the text, which accounts for the incomplete list of numbers.

• Codes that I generated and list throughout the text are printed in Italics in the way they appear in MAXQDA and in the coded documents in the appendix. At points where I refer to them slightly rephrased to match the respective sentence, they are not explicitly marked.
1. Introduction

“The essence of tragedy is human loss. To qualify as a national tragedy, a media event needs victims in substantial numbers or victims with exceptional symbolic value to the community.” (Pantti & Sumiala 2009: 124)

On 15th of March, 2019, a 28 year old Australian man entered the Al Noor mosque and the Linwood mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, with a shot gun in his hand and a video camera attached to his forehead, and shot 91 people during their Friday prayer. Fifty-one people were confirmed dead within the next few days, while forty more were injured; the perpetrator later pleaded not guilty for what was charged as an act of terrorism following an ideology of white supremacy and extreme racism and Islamophobia. 1 Prime minister Jacinda Ardern, who had then been in office for merely one and a half years and had already gained international attention for being the world’s youngest female head of government2, as well as only the second leader in modern times who has given birth in office3, virtually had the world’s eyes on herself when she had to form a strategy to react to and cope with the attacks and their aftermath on a political, communicational, and personal level.

She decided on a strategy of solidarity with the victims and their community which, alongside severe condemnation of the attacks and verbal consolation for those affected, as well as concrete political and judicial consequences such as the immediate restriction of gun laws4, drew on the use of extremely strong symbols. On a cultural level, this included the wearing of a veil (hijab) during her first meeting with leaders of the Muslim community and family members of the victims, and the wearing of a traditional Māori cloak during the Christchurch Memorial ceremony. Linguistic symbolism can be found in her opening of said ceremony using the traditional Arabic greeting, "As-salam alaykum", literally translating to "Peace be unto you", and, later on in the same speech, in a saying in Māori, "Ko tātou, tātou" ("We are one"), which also became the official title of the Christchurch Memorial Service. As “[n]ational tragedies exhibit high levels of media performativity and are frequently commemorated in the media when journalists try to make sense of a new traumatic event” (Pantti & Sumiala 2009: 122), the number of public reactions to this was extremely high during and after Ardern’s appearances at the mourning ceremonies, press conferences, and parliamentary statements, and the following weeks and months revealed a large diversity

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of opinions and perspectives on Ardern's choice on how to show (and act) solidarity in order to reincorporate the Muslim community into the national community of New Zealand. The question on whether and how she succeeded to do this is particularly interesting in regard to the essential multicultural character of the nation she was trying to reunite regarding central identity markers like religion, ethnicity, and language, considering that

[w]hile solidarity within and amongst subaltern groups is widely seen as a progressive force, the classical idea of societal-level national solidarity is now widely seen, implicitly or explicitly, as at best mythical, and at worst dangerous and exclusionary. (Banting & Kymlicka 2017: 5)

Few terms are so ubiquitous in public life, instrumentalized in so many contexts, and yet comparably vague, as solidarity. The concept of solidarity as a feeling, a strategy, a motivation to act or a basis for policies is outstandingly resonant in current events, on interpersonal levels as well as international ones, on global as well as local issues. It is discussed as an aspect of public discourse and source of legitimation in the whole range of the political spectrum, from the far left to the far right (Serntedakis 2017: 85). From an anthropological viewpoint, solidarity is deeply traversed by issues from all of its branches, be it the aspect of family making and caring taken from kinship anthropology, of reciprocity in economic anthropology, the question of identity and group effervescence dealt with in political anthropology or the symbolic and ritualistic character of solidary acts (de Koning & de Jong 2017: 16-17). Indeed, the very core question of solidarity can be seen as the underlying riddle of any social or cultural science: the question of what constitutes and distinguishes groups, what actuates and legitimizes them, or, put more polemically, what makes and holds together the "we" that is society.

The fascination with the topic, as well as its relatively uncommon character in anthropological research (Rakopoulos 2016: 142), may come from the tension between its scholarly complexity on the one hand and its compelling simplicity and universality on the other, as it touches everyday social relations as well as structures of governance and transgressive social movements (de Koning & de Jong 2017: 12); or, in short, nothing less than the core themes of humans as social beings and as active parts of groups, be they family, tribal communities, or nation-states. This leads us to the role of solidarity in active processes of community building and group formation, as in the case after the Christchurch attacks. The notion of solidarity can be used to "bridge enormous distances and differences", being able either to encourage inclusion or, in opposition to that, to "sharpen and shore up the borders" of a group (de Koning & de Jong 2017: 12), which could also be framed as "solidarity's ever-recurring problem of selective indignation" (Dueholm Rasch & Arab 2017:
10). It is hence crucial to thoroughly analyze the underlying motives, structures, and conditions which determine the eventual concrete act of solidarity.

This thesis will be, by performing such an analysis on a very particular, recent, and most relevant event, an attempt to depict the aforementioned dynamics and tensions in the case of Jacinda Ardern’s strategy of solidarity, as well as a brief approximation to understanding how they were received and assessed in different parts of society and media. Leaning on a theoretical framework provided in large part by Émile Durkheim and Karl Marx, who to a major degree coined the history of research in that field (see Chapter 2) as well as later anthropological critique and approaches, I will analyse Ardern’s first four official appearances and speeches after the attacks thoroughly, taking a close look at the linguistic and cultural symbols involved; to get a better understanding of why, how, and in what position she applies them, I will use the tools of Mayring’s (2014) qualitative structuring content analysis (see Chapter 4). After leading the results back to the theoretical framework provided, I will shortly outline the diversity of the public reactions by giving examples of the most prevalent story lines in the discourse (see Chapter 5).

The centre of this analysis is the issue of how to foster solidarity in a multicultural context (on the example of Ardern’s reaction to an outstanding national situation), and how to reasonably include and assess the underlying markers of identity, as “[f]ocusing on national identity as a counterbalance to multiculturalism is merely one approach and could be counterproductive if pursued insensitively” (O’Donnell 2007: 249). Banting & Kymlicka (2017) write about the tension between diversity and solidarity that it is “mediated by the nature of national identities and the strategies of political actors”. They further argue that “[d]ifferent forms of diversity may also play a quite different role (...); while some scholars think that “racialized difference is more corrosive of solidarity than ethnic, linguistic, or religious diversity”, others argue for religious diversity as “the greater threat, since it raises the prospect of deep conflicts in core political values” (2017: 13).

The core question that can hopefully be answered after a thorough analysis is in what way Ardern’s political strategy was produced and perceived, and especially which conceptual and socio-political tensions arise on a conceptual as well as socio-political level, taking into account all of the aforementioned aspects of collective identity and solidarity.

2. Theoretical Frame: Solidarity and Social Cohesion

That we help and protect each other, work together, and share the crops is a universal and timeless principle that has been explored since the beginnings of social sciences; social morality and the feeling of responsibility to each other is the basis of group
cohesion in a Durkheimian sense, as it was "envisioned as inherent in various rules and
duties that are pitched toward a range of socially defined goods that exceeds individual
wants or desires" (Mattingly & Throop 2018: 478).

The seemingly natural moral ground that makes individuals stand up for each other
inside a social unit, however, does not necessarily apply for people outside the ingroup.
These invisible borders have become blurry in the last decades in the context of the
establishment of human rights as a codex for (ideally) the inclusion of each and every
individual into one large unit of mankind (O'Donnell 2007: 249); the limit to which we share
and help has – at least in theory – widened, showing that the making and unmaking of
communities, of in- and outgroups, is ultimately an arbitrary and, in many regards, a
conscious process. While the idea of nationalism neglects the "possibility of a universalist
justification for action", human rights or the concept of humanity enforces it (ibid: 260).

The question of how large the group that one belongs to is allowed to be, or, put
differently, the question of who deserves one's solidarity – the helping hands, empathy, and
the share of the crops – is as old as social theory. It is essentially the search for the source
of the "recognition of communality or fellowship" and "the willingness or obligation to act
upon this recognition" (de Koning & de Jong 2017: 13), and has been approached by
numerous scholars, among them two of the most notorious social scientists: Émile
Durkheim and Karl Marx. The following subchapters are meant as a brief overview of their
respective takes on the concept of solidarity and group cohesion, and particularly their main
divergences and deficiencies.

Conceptually, the term solidarity in the frame of political modernity superseded the notion
of fraternité (deriving, of course, from the French revolution), moving from a "bridge
between imagined siblings" towards a "broader political community of Anthropos"
(Rakopoulos 2016: 146). In their anthropological essay Putting Flesh to the Bone: Looking
for Solidarity in Diversity, Here and Now, Oosterlynck et al identify four main sources of
solidarity, each of which represents a specific basis for group loyalty, a certain stance for
the value that individuality has for a group, and, most relevant, an "ideological position on
how societies develop social order and cohesion" (2015: 3). Three of them constitute the
central aspects of Durkheim's and Marx' theoretical work: Interdependence, on which
Durkheim reflected in the concept of organic solidarity, shared norms and values, again
represented by Durkheim, this time referring to his concept of collective consciousness, and
struggle, which was first brought up by Karl Marx and his vision of a rising class of the
proletariat. I will come back to these three sources later in my analysis of Ardern's premise
and aims in the mourning process of Christchurch, trying to identify their roles in that
precise act of solidarity, in that specific context of (lost) group cohesion.
2.1 Durkheim's Mechanical and Organic Solidarity

With his classical work *The Division of Labour in Society* (1893), Durkheim was the first social scientist to formulate a theory on group cohesion and collective consciousness explicitly including the concept of solidarity (Durkheim 1977: 17).

Before the division of labour as it evolved in the aftermath of industrialisation, he argues, groups were mainly held together by what he called *mechanical solidarity*, a form of togetherness strengthened by an “affinity of blood, attachment to the same soil, the cult of their ancestors, [or] a commonality of habits” (Durkheim 1984: 219, quoted by Sohrabi 2019: 1290); togetherness by similarity, one could say, or routine – a solidarity based on *collective consciousness*, which “provides a mutuality, enabling individuals to relate in terms of shared morals and goals” (Hunt & Benford 2004: 434). He explores this question starting from the phenomenon of crime and punishment, asking what in essence determines a crime as such, and what the reason and goal of punishment are in relation to group cohesion (Durkheim 1977: 111 ff.). He further evolves his theory by arguing that with a higher division of labour, the form of solidarity turned from mechanical to *organic*, allowing a more diverse pool of values and norms to coexist as what still functions as a modern society at large (Durkheim 1977: 152 ff).

Organic solidarity “springs from diversification and specialisation of labour in modern societies, and arises from the functional interdependency and mutual complementarity” (de Koning & de Jong 2017: 12). The value consensus so crucial for pre-industrial societies still exists, to some extent, in organic solidarity; however, the values that in today’s Western societies happen to be most important are to a large part individualistic and not group-bound – like freedom of expression or self-fulfillment (Sohrabi 2019: 1289). This seems to be a paradox, and it is indeed one of the arenas in which the most friction between the concepts of nation-states and borders, solidarity and group cohesion, and multiculturalism occurs, leading away from the simple idea of cohesion through sameness:

To Durkheim, the borders of a society are not co-extensive with national borders: “society is not constituted simply by the mass of individuals who comprise it, the ground they occupy, the things they use, or the movements they make, but above all by the idea it has of itself” [Durkheim 1995, 425]. (Sohrabi 2019: 1291)

2.2 Marx’ Class “In and For Itself”

Following Karl Marx’ central thought of a dichotomically divided society into proletariat and bourgeoisie and his thereof deriving theory of social change through the overcoming of this dichotomy, one can say that according to Marx, solidarity springs from communal struggle – from a societal goal shared by a group (or, in his case, a class) that needs to stand together
united in order to achieve that goal. Durkheim's concepts can be related to him insofar as that already for Marx, a certain type of collective consciousness was needed in order to become “a class for itself” rather than just “a class in itself”, and in order to start and ultimately win the struggle (Carrier 2015: 30).

The interesting aspect of Marx in the context of this thesis is that somehow, in today’s society, the buzzword “Solidarity!” has widely become known as a catchphrase of the leftist community, scholars and pop culture; what is often forgotten is that particularly in anthropology, the dealing with the term solidarity has often been criticized for being too naïve and too focused on the happy-go-lucky attitude of supposedly equal communities that hold together and stand in for each other, rather than on the sometimes hierarchical, interest-driven, and exclusive character of the phenomenon (see Chapter 2.3). Other anthropologists have argued that the mainly materialistic struggle as a source of solidarity as depicted by Marx has become “more complex (...) as questions of social justice do not only include struggles over redistribution, but also struggles for the recognition of ethnic and cultural minorities and for the political representation of different groups in society [Fraser 1995, 2010]” (Oosterlynck et al 2015: 9). These ethnic struggles are, however, addressed in Marxist theory insofar as that it locates nationalism and multiculturalism as their exacerbating factors (O’Donnell 2007: 253).

2.3 Anthropological Critique and Expansions

While in political and populist, and colloquial use of the term, solidarity is to the most part positively connotated, there have been critical approaches to the traditional understanding of the concept, especially in modern anthropology as well as extended approaches to the classical sociological theories. It has been argued that in the last years, solidarity "has turned into an ideal and a quicksand for anthropologists and other social scientists" (Rozakou 2017: 103). The concepts of solidarity following Durkheim and Marx, for example, do not provide enough conceptual material to interpret the solidary issues of today's nation-states; even though both of them answer the question of what unites and divides societies — Durkheim regards the division of labor as unifying, Marx as “fundamentally divisive” — neither of them truly takes into account ubiquitous factors that play such a crucial role in determining modern nations’ cohesion and division today, such as multiculturalism and ethnic and political diversity due to globalization (O’Donnell 2007: 252, 253). Instead, Marx foresaw “a future of solidarity in a classless society” (ibid: 265), a notion that could be useful if one was to abstract the idea of class to that of intrasocietal groups in general, while Durkheim’s model of a modern society presumes “largely autonomous nation states within
which economic activity was effectively regulated by the state", an assumption weakened by the reduced impact of borders on the demarcation of societies (ibid: 251).

Ideally, practices of solidarity in the Durkheimian "organic" sense link people "bilaterally and horizontally [Sitrin 2012] by sharing common interests and needs, irrespective of class, race, gender, ethnic background and education" (Dueholm Rasch & van Drunen 2017: 25); however, as the authors continue to argue, they "do not go without power imbalances of their own, and people engaged in solidarity initiatives have often been accused of being (...) vertically organized" (ibid: 25), or, as Sohrabi puts it: "(...) within a Durkheimian paradigm there exists no conceptual link between equality (or justice or access to resources) and social cohesion. A society could be extremely unequal in wealth and power, but extremely cohesive" (2019: 1294). This, however, counts only for mechanical and not for organic solidarity, for in the age of multi-ethnic societies and human rights, what constitutes the strongest threat for the feeling of cohesion and national identification is lacking social equality, caused by e.g. an inadequate welfare system (O’Donnell 2007: 256, 265).

In their widely acclaimed book The Strains of Commitment, Banting & Kymlicka suggest an interesting classification of solidarity into three subgenres: Civic solidarity, characterized by mutual tolerance; an absence of prejudice; a commitment to living together in peace, free from inter-communal violence; acceptance of people of diverse ethnicities, languages and religions as legitimate members of the community, as belonging, as part of ‘us’ (...) (2017: 4); democratic solidarity, which they describe as i.a. “a support for human rights and equalities” and “equal participation of citizens from all backgrounds, tolerance for the political expression of diverse cultural views consistent with basic rights and equalities” (ibid); and redistributive solidarity, which includes “support for programmes that recognize and accommodate the distinctive needs and identities of different ethnocultural groups” (ibid).

All of these aspects can be found in Ardern’s strategy, which is why I would like to include the terms into my later analysis. To sum up the somewhat tense and multifaceted character of solidarity, I would like to draw on de Koning & de Jong’s proposal for a “multiscalar and multidimensional approach” to it, as it is "produced at the intersection of the everyday and the extraordinary, unspoken norms and political rallying cries, and of idealistic, voluntaristic actions and institutionalized systems" (2017: 17) – in short, a subject that deserves to be treated according to its complexity.
3. Methodology

For my main analysis of Jacinda Ardern's transcribed speeches, I will use the tools of Philipp Mayring's qualitative content analysis, to be precise, a content structuring / theme analysis based on deductive category assignment that will help me code and assess Ardern's first three speeches (Mayring 2014, 2015). In Chapter 5, I am presenting several so-called story lines of the public discourse around Jacinda Ardern. This term, as well as the method of clustering certain statements or expressions into packages of meaning which are then used to carve out the story line, that is, the core assertion of a discourse, are taken from William A. Gamson's frame analysis as described in Reiner Keller's Diskursforschung (2011). All material is processed, coded and organised with the data analysis software MAXQDA. I will set forth my aim of applying the tools of a content structuring in Chapter 3.2, after briefly expounding how the material was accumulated in the following subchapter.

3.1 Acquisition of Data

In the frame of a B.A. thesis, neither the number of pages nor the amount of time is unlimited; quite the opposite, which is why the subject of this paper – which might, considering the width of concepts and sources to explore, well fill the capacity of a PhD thesis – is reduced beforehand down to only a few focus points and a strategically minimized data corpus. The choice of text material for the analysis of Ardern’s strategy and use of symbols was quickly done, as she got the largest amount of public attention for wearing a hijab during her meeting with Islamic community leaders of New Zealand on the 17th of March, two days after the attack. Because this meeting has not been sufficiently covered by the press, and in order to get to a more holistic and text-based approach of her reaction to the attacks, I included the two parts of her first press conference on the day of the attacks (March 15) taken from CBSN⁵ and CBC News⁶, her first statement as prime minister after she met with the Islamic community leaders (also from March 17), which was released on the official government website⁷, her first ministerial statement in front of the parliament (March 19)⁸, and her opening speech at the official Christchurch Memorial Service two weeks later (March 29)⁹. All four appearances are firsts, which constitutes a workable

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⁵ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FfqQZWSa9Hg own transcription.
⁷ https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/pm-statement-christchurch-shooting-%E2%80%93-4pm-17-march
⁸ https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/19-03-2019/we-cannot-know-your-grief-but-we-can-walk-with-you-at-every-stage/
continuum, and each of them displays a different role, audience, and purpose, which will be defined and discussed throughout the analysis. Transcripts of each speech (except for Sp.01, which I transcribed myself) could easily be found on several trustworthy websites.

Apart from the text material, I will also take into consideration information from video material if it is a central part of my argument and her strategy (for example, the short video that exists of her wearing the hijab\textsuperscript{10}, as well as a video of her wearing a Māori cloak during the Christchurch Memorial Service). It won’t, however, be included in the coding system with MAXQDA and will be clearly marked as “external” material.

Collecting data for Chapter 5 was a more complex task, as the possible accusation of arbitrariness was in constant conflict with the necessity to select and reduce sources. All data was drawn from the internet and for reasons of legibility and unity limited to the English language; videos and pictures were excluded for similar reasons. Articles and news pages are included in the same way as comments and discussion forums in order to get a broader range of styles, authors, and perspectives on the discourse. My research followed a roughly hermeneutic method, as I went through several, increasingly specified research sessions of viewing as many links as possible and collecting everything that seemed relevant regarding the content.

3.2 Mayring’s Qualitative Content Analysis

Qualitative content analysis, in its broadest definition, can be any kind of qualitative analysis of any kind of material deriving from communication (Mayring 2015: 11). Apart from this most inclusive and therefore least useful consensus, there are not many features of this methodology that all theoretical paradigms can agree on, except for its necessarily systematic, rule-bound and theory-guided procedure (ibid: 13, see also Mayring 2014: 39 ff.)

Following the general step-by-step process of a content analysis, the first step towards a specification of the approach, after defining formality and origin of the material as I have done above, is establishing the direction of analysis (Mayring 2014: 48). Regarding the theoretical paradigm, this means for my thesis an orientation towards qualitative social research or the interpretative paradigm (Mayring 2015: 32), which, especially in its variation of symbolic interactionism after Herbert Blumer and Georg Herbert Mead, provides the focus points of social interaction, the respective situation in which the agent (or subject) is analysed, and the social background; despite the paradigm’s preferred method of inductive category formation, I will stick to a deductive system, leaning on Mayring’s conviction that “content-related arguments should always be given preference over procedural arguments; validity is regarded more highly than reliability” (2014: 41).

\textsuperscript{10}https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ibjKbZGlua8
There are three basic procedure types of qualitative content analysis: Summary, Explication, and Structuring (ibid: 64). Taking into account the limited amount of research resources and my relatively pre-structured research question, the structuring type seems to be the most fruitful choice. This presupposes a deductive category assignment, generating a definition of categories, anchor samples, and coding rules (ibid: 95), as well as the definition of content-analytical units (ibid: 51, see appendix for coding guideline and definitions). After these preparatory steps, I will assess my material with MAXQDA according to the coding guideline and category system, dividing it into sub- and main categories, and making sense of the results in Chapters 4.1 to 4.3, affiliating it in a last conclusive step to the conceptual background of solidarity and cohesion in Chapter 4.4.

4. Analysis

Jacinda Ardern took a very clear standpoint in the aftermath of the Christchurch attacks and managed to position herself both above and alongside the citizens of New Zealand, in particular with the victims’ relatives and Muslim community – even though, religion being the main identity marker of this community and her having grown up as a Mormon\(^{11}\), she had not been and still was not a part of it. She did this by drawing immediate judicial consequences, showing strong symbols and acts of solidarity, and choosing linguistically and semantically specific wording. Ardern appeared in public for the first time on the afternoon of the day of the shootings, giving only a brief press conference in which she announced that she would be later returning to the press conference after having been briefed on the attacks by the police in Wellington. Two hours later, an extended continuation of that first press conference followed, in which she revealed more information. She then released an official statement as Prime Minister two days later, which was soon followed by the first ministerial statement that she held in parliament on March 19\(^{th}\). Her final official appearance regarding the attacks was her opening speech of the national memorial service which was held two weeks later, on March 29\(^{th}\), in Hagley Park in front of 20,000 people, in the presence of Muslim leaders, survivors of the attack, musician Yusuf Islam (Cat Stevens) and several heads of state.

In order to embed what she said in a theoretical framework and, after the analysis, in a consistent and self-contained strategy pattern, I will in each subchapter explore two concepts to form a category system, explaining and correlating the theoretical background with the respective research question that the concepts were derived from, and the material extracted from the texts. Following Mayring’s theme analysis, I will then describe each

subcategory using the paraphrases that I have developed with MAXQDA, to later cluster and summarize in their main categories in Chapter 4.4. Finally, I will relate my results back to the scholars and theories of group cohesion depicted in Chapter 2.

4.1 Content and Structure of Ardern's Strategy

Symbolic politics – coming from the German Symbolpolitik and not to be confused with political symbolism – is defined as “a politics of signs, of words, gestures and images”\(^\text{12}\). Banting & Kymlicka argue that because solidarity “will not emerge spontaneously, it requires political actors who champion it” in order to embed solidarity into the field of politics; these actors are also needed to institutionalize solidarity, be it through laws, financial help, or cultural acknowledgment (2017: 33). The authors also point towards the “importance of political agency (...) in shaping the relationship between diversity and solidarity” when it comes to narratives of peoplehood and nationalism, which are “not self-enacting” but rather “told and retold by particular social actors” (ibid: 13).

4.1.1 Symbolism

Following this definition, it made sense to cluster together any of Ardern’s acts or statements which bear any kind of symbolism, be it linguistic, rhetoric, or actual. Therefore, my category system contains the main category of Linguistic / Rhetoric Symbols, which is further divided into the use of Arabic and use of Māori as linguistic symbols, condemnation and solidarity imagery (solidarity) as rhetoric symbols\(^\text{13}\), and the name ban / focus on victims as well as her repeated elaboration of the concrete consequences – financial, judicial and emotional help and support that was being provided for especially the victims’ families, but also the citizens of New Zealand in general (help/money/law) as actual symbols (or a display of the state’s priorities, of showing actions following words). This last category might seem to stand in opposition to the definition given at the beginning, however, it fits in the category of symbolism if we treat it according to its goal, that is, “reinforcing solidarity in daily political life” and “on a recurring basis [embedding it in] key public institutions and policy regimes (...)” (ibid: 15, 33). In this context the sanctions and support addressed by Ardern are, besides their actual consequences, primarily a symbolic means to the end of showing

\(^{12}\) http://www.bpb.de/apuz/29745/symbolische-politik-essay?p=all, own translation

\(^{13}\) Originally, I coded consolation as a second rhetoric category next to condemnation, but it didn’t hold during my first run-through of the material, being too vague and too easily to be subdivided into other concepts, which is why it was deleted.

Of course, her wearing the veil and the Māori cloak at two different occasions also play a major role in this symbolism, but as said already, this is in the context of my purely text-based analysis considered as external material and therefore didn’t receive any code.
solidarity. Following the steps of Mayring’s content structuring, I will summarize my findings per subcategory and then per main category and not per text, unless there is a specific semantic pattern at work that needs to be related to the chronology of the speeches.

The use of Māori and Arabic are per quantity the two least used symbols (see Figure 1), but the structure in which they occur carries an interesting meaning; while she doesn’t use either of the languages in her first three appearances (further being referred to as Sp.01, Sp.01-2, and Sp.02), they build a frame for the ministerial speech (Sp.03) as well as the opening speech (Sp.04), appearing at the very start and the very end of both speeches. While Māori is used at the beginning of Sp.03 to express several concepts valuable to New Zealand and the situation (manaakitanga, meaning care, help, and support\textsuperscript{14}, and aroha, meaning love, concern, and compassion\textsuperscript{15}) and in the beginning of Sp.04 to greet New Zealand’s leaders and remind them of aroha, it marks the ending of both speeches with the sentence that has become the main slogan of the attacks’ aftermath: Ko tātou, tātou – We are one.

Arabic, on the other hand, serves in Sp.03 as a simple greeting at the start and end, while in Sp.04 it is used to express values that the Muslim community brings to New Zealand: she uses the traditional greeting “As-salam alaikum” as an antidote to her own speechlessness, translating it to its literal meaning and linking this to the admirable attitude of the victims, which has “left us humble (…) and united” (Sp.04: 1). She then uses it again at the end of the speech without further comment. Both languages are therefore expressions not only of the groups involved in the tragedy (Māori standing for traditional New Zealand, Arabic for its Muslim migrant and refugees members), but also as a symbol of the multiculturalism and diversity of the country that Ardern is representing as well as a direct linkage of the values they stand for.

\textsuperscript{14}https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?idiom=&phrase=&proverb=&loan=&histLoanWords=&keywords=manaakitanga

\textsuperscript{15}https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?idiom=&phrase=&proverb=&loan=&histLoanWords=&keywords=aroha
The other two Language / Rhetoric Symbols, condemnation and solidarity, appear in all four documents with regular continuity. The main tool of condemnation is, of course, clearly directed towards the perpetrator and lies in using the word “terrorist” or “terrorism” almost every time Ardern speaks of him from Sp.02 onwards, even though he was not to be charged with terrorism until June 2019. She also clearly contrasts him against the victims and citizens of New Zealand, placing him outside of both the physical and the imagined space of the nation: “They [the victims] are us. The person who has perpetuated this violence against us is not. They have no place in New Zealand” (Sp.01: 4-5); and later: “These are people who I would describe as having extremist views that have absolutely no place in New Zealand and, in fact, have no place in the world” (Sp.01-2: 9) Besides repeatedly describing the attacks as extremist, violent, hateful, and racist, her condemnation becomes most clear when she explicitly addresses it: “(...) the strongest possible condemnation of the ideology of the people who did this. You may have chosen us – but we utterly reject and condemn you” (Sp. 01-2: 21-22). She also takes into the condemnation several appeals to her audience and to the media to draw consequences, relating the attacks to things that can be done in the future (e.g. Sp.03: 3, Sp.04: 2).

Meanwhile, her usage of solidary images focuses on the victims and provides them with consoling imagery – “We can walk with you at every stage” (Sp.03: 1), “We stand with them” (Sp.04: 1). The interesting aspect about her implication of this concept is that it works both ways – not only from the national community towards the minority of Muslims, but also the other way around. In Sp.04 she says: “(...) a community who, in the face of hate and violence, had every right to express anger but instead opened their doors for all of us to grieve with them” (Sp.04: 1) This might be to emphasize the agency of the Muslim community, in order to work against exactly the criticism of leadership figures expressing solidarity that was explained in Chapter 2.2. It is also very important to address – and this has been one of the main critique points from other New Zealand heads of state – how her very emphasis on solidarity actually creates the categories of “them” and “us”. This is clearly visualised in a word cloud by MAXQDA (see Figure 2) ordered by word frequencies, which shows the small pronoun “we” as the large centre, however, quickly

Figure 2: Word Cloud of all 5 Documents

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followed by its opposite, “they”; the same goes for the variations “our” and “their”. This can be related to Banting & Kymlicka’s point that “the politics that builds inclusive solidarity may be conflictual in the first instance” (2017: 3), and that there is “a logical gap between a cognitive belief in universal values and a felt solidarity with a bounded ‘we’” (ibid: 16). Also, as Gilroy puts it, “the formation of every ‘we’ must leave out or exclude a ‘they’” (1997: 301-302, quoted in Jenkins 2014: 22). This becomes even more complicated taking into consideration that

the repression of difference by the use of the term ‘we’ may (...) be a way of disguising repressive relationships of domination, subordination and inequality, but the celebration of difference may have exactly the same effect. If difference is compatible with both material equality and equality of power, ‘we’ has the potential to be a term of non-repressive solidarity [Wright, 1985]. Under what conditions might this be possible? (Levitas 1995: 95)

“Strong elements of the national imaginary (...) are an important part of the coverage”, state Pantti & Sumiala (2009: 127). These strong elements can be found in the flags in the background of the press conference17 as well as the hijab18 and the Māori cloak19 as symbols of the multicultural character of the nation that Ardern represents; this is further underlined by their later argument:

Moreover, the active use of religious symbols in the reporting of mourning rituals makes it clear that there is an established linkage between media, religion and the nation in constituting the sense of community in times of national tragedies. This makes it possible for the media to use religious symbols and narratives in their reporting to communicate the collective loss and grief related to it. (ibid: 131)

By wearing these religious (and cultural) symbols, Ardern unifies the Māori and Muslim culture under one "New Zealand" culture; it is notable that instead of stressing verbally the New Zealand aspect of the Muslim community, she overtakes a Muslim symbol for herself, virtually communicating that not New Zealand is a part of the Muslim community that it needs to stress to blend in but, reversely, that Muslim culture is a part of what constitutes New Zealand and therefore a part of herself representing it. This has special symbolic value as the religion that the hijab stands for was the aim of the hate crime in the first place. It is underlined further by her repeated use of the sentence “They are us”, which, it could be argued, in this context offsets the critique of her artificial dividing of the groups mentioned earlier (see also Chapter 4.2.3).

17 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PyrUQdn2EhU
18 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BDxXlDvITU
The last subcategory, that of consequences – *name ban/focus on victim* and *help/money/law* – can be found in all of Ardern’s speeches. She makes a very clear point in Sp.03 of never using the perpetrator’s name: “There is one person at the centre of this act of terror against our Muslim community in New Zealand”, she says.

He sought many things from his act of terror, but one was notoriety. And that is why you will never hear me mention his name. He is a terrorist. He is a criminal. He is an extremist. But he will, when I speak, be nameless. And to others I implore you: speak the names of those who were lost, rather than name of the man who took them. He may have sought notoriety, but we in New Zealand will give him nothing. Not even his name.” (Sp.3: 2)

She sticks to this through all her appearances, meanwhile giving stories and details about the victims (e.g. Sp.03: 1) as well as consolation and clear verbal support towards them (Sp.01-2: 20). While this is a more symbolic consequence, the concrete side of it are the responsive actions that took place. These include the passing of a restriction of gun laws within one month after the attacks, justice to all people involved (Sp.02: 1), a funeral grant of $10,000 for each of the victims (Sp. 02: 2), as well as other financial compensations, and mental health support for the victims in particular, but also for all citizens of New Zealand (Sp.03: 2). Remarkable in this aspect are her insistence and perseverance reminding her audience again and again that all these arrangements exist and are there to be used.

### 4.1.2 Mourning Rituals

In their article "Till Death Do Us Join: Media, Mourning Rituals and the Sacred Centre of Society", Mervi Pantti and Johanna Sumiala draw a precise picture of national tragedies and the ways in which they are being coped with. As quoted at the very start of this thesis, a national tragedy, to qualify as such, needs human loss – substantial numbers of victims or “victims with exceptional symbolic value to the community” (Pantti & Sumiala 2009: 124). Both of these conditions are fulfilled in the case of the Christchurch attacks; it is unprecedented in New Zealand by the number of victims, and the fact that they were targets of a hate crime aimed exclusively at a Muslim minority in a Western, Anglo-Saxon state infinitely increases their symbolic value to a country which, as Ardern herself says, “prides itself on being open, peaceful, diverse” (Sp.03: 2).

Pantti & Sumiala argue that “mourning rituals in the media are constructed as inclusive and affirmative. This is to say that there is an explicit linkage established between mourning rituals and the construction of social solidarity” (2009: 130). In their article, they found the concept of ritual

on exceptionality; ritual refers to a form of action that includes dramatic symbolism and arouses emotions through which individuals might think, feel and act as members of a community [Dayan and Katz, 1992; Rothenbuhler, 1998]. Additionally, we assume that rituals point to the sacred, beyond everyday life routines. Following Edward Shils’ (1975) insight on society, we adopt a notion of the ‘sacred centre’, which deals with fundamental values, beliefs and meanings (...) that bind individuals together. (ibid: 120, emphasis added)

This is why the category system includes the codes arouse/address emotions as well as “sacred centre”/NZ values (for definitions see Coding Guideline). Indeed, as Ardern continues to address her own grief and that of the whole nation (Sp.01-2: 2, Sp.02: 1), “grief becomes a major form of nation-building” (Pantti & Sumiala 2009: 127). Besides grief, pain or sadness, the second cluster of emotions that is repeatedly addressed and contrasts the first one contains mainly love and gratitude, both from the Muslim community towards the whole of New Zealand as well as the reversed, and gratitude towards the rest of the world: “We are deeply grateful for all messages of sympathy, support and solidarity that we are receiving from our friends all around the world. And we are grateful to the global Muslim community who have stood with us, and we stand with them” (Sp.03: 1).

As “collective politics involves collective imaginings of similarity as well as of difference” (Jenkins 2014: 25), another important part of remaking the so-called sacred centre is by forming new national myths and narratives, weaving the national tragedy into the national history and legacy of a country, using “collective stories and myths of society as a whole (...) to the enterprise of promoting and improving human life and welfare from one generation to the next” (McAdams1993: 14):

Collective action cannot occur in the absence of a “we” characterized by common traits and specific solidarity. ... A collective actor cannot exist without reference to experiences, symbols and myths which form the basis of its individuality’ (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 87, 92, quoted in Mcdonald 2002: 110).

One might discount the use of narratives as something influencing nothing more than the imaginary, but it is always useful to remember – and very clearly shown in the case of New Zealand – that perceptions of the self, of the collective one belongs to, are always real in their consequences. At this point it seems also useful to refer again to Banting & Kymlicka’s argument that “(...) stories of peoplehood are not static or self-enacting: they are always told and retold by particular social actors” (2017: 13). Therefore, under the code myth/narrative (for coding rules differentiating this from (re)build collective identity and “sacred centre” see Coding Guideline, in the appendix), are collected all sequences where Ardern tells stories of individuals, or where the segments are leading to a new story or myth of the attacks as a legacy that can be learned from: “Let that be the legacy of the 15th of March (...) for now, we will remember those who have left this place. We will remember the first responders who gave so much of themselves to save others. We will remember the
tears of our nation, and the new resolve we have formed” (Sp.04: 2). Segments of narration are also building upon the collective memory of New Zealand (Sp.03: 1): “There will be countless stories, some of which we may never know, but to each, we acknowledge you in this place, in this House [the parliament]” (Sp.03: 1). Ardern tells stories that aim at strengthening the base of community as one certain focus of identity: not ethnicity or nationality, but humanity (O’Donnell 2007: 259). Therefore, the protagonists in her stories are of all ethnic, religious, and national groups, but have one thing in common: their “right” sense of values and commitment to the notion of humanity uniting New Zealand:

One [story] I wish to mention is that of Hati Mohammed Daoud Nabi. He was the 71-year-old man who opened the door at the Al-Noor mosque and uttered the words ‘Hello brother, welcome’. His final words. Of course he had no idea of the hate that sat behind the door, but his welcome tells us so much – that he was a member of a faith that welcomed all its members, that showed openness, and care. (e.g. Sp.03: 3)

The sacred centre or values of the nation finds mentioning in all of Ardern’s speeches except for the first one, which is rather short; the values she addresses as being inert to New Zealand and “mak[ing] us us” (Sp.03: 1) are: diversity, kindness, compassion (Sp.01-2: 19-20), aroha and manaakitanga (as explained in 4.1.1, Sp.03: 1), bravery (ibid), openness and care (Sp.03: 3), peacefulness and diversity (Sp.03: 2), and the hard work and commitment of public institutions such a police and hospitals in order to improve the situation (e.g. Sp.03: 1). The most impressive and, simultaneously, summarizing example of this code is the following sequence from her first press conference:

For those of you who are watching at home tonight, and questioning how this could have happened here, we – New Zealand – we were not a target because we are a safe harbour for those who hate. We were not chosen for this act of violence because we condone racism, because we are an enclave for extremism. We were chosen for the very fact that we are none of these things. Because we represent diversity, kindness, compassion, a home for those who share our values, refuge for those who need it. And those values, I can assure you, will not, and cannot, be shaken by this attack. We are a proud nation of more than 200 ethnicities, 160 languages. And amongst that diversity we share common values. (Sp.01-2: 19-20)

Ardern could not have made it clearer that it is (supposedly) these positive traits that constitute the nation as such as well as defines which individuals belong to it, rather than the other way around. This could be seen, again, as an example of the paradox character of the individualistic values that constitute most of today’s Western nation-states; it could also be interpreted as the attempt to prevent any negatively connotated notions to slip in her rhetoric while she is highlighting the stark contrast between the positive values, the sacred
centre of New Zealand, and the despicable attitude of the perpetrator without, however, invoking that very attitude of revenge and "an eye for an eye" in the country's citizens:

Indeed, we might think that nationhood works best when it is deep in the background, as a taken-for-granted presupposition of social life. For when nationhood is highlighted or primed – when it is taken from the back of people's minds to the front of their minds – it can trigger xenophobia. (Banting & Kymlicka 2017: 22)

### 4.2 Ardern's Position of Leadership

"But I believe what I have done has not been about leadership. All I have done is simply echoed the humanity of New Zealanders."  

– Jacinda Ardern on 23.3.2019

Jacinda Ardern as the prime minister of New Zealand of cause acts in this role, but it is crucial to remember that there are other identity markers which constitute the individual that she is at the same time. She reacted to the Christchurch attacks not only as premier, but also as a woman, a mother, a New Zealander, a leadership figure. All of these facets carry different levels of meaning that entail different means of interpretation and critique. Especially regarding the feminist discourse about the problematic nature of veil wearing, it would have been interesting to analyse the material in terms of her womanhood. Unfortunately, the material itself does not provide any sequence whatsoever that would legitimize the existence of such a category; I will therefore depict those shortly in Chapter 5, while here merely focusing on Ardern's position of a leadership figure, which was – alongside the feminist aspect – one of the main topics in later public discourse.

Annette Jansen describes the aspect of solidarity as a part of leadership as follows:

If I were boldly – and somewhat roughly – to replace the term 'solidarity' with 'compassion' and 'responsibility' by 'accountability', then the following statement by Omri Elisha could turn out to be quite illuminating: *Compassion invokes an ideal of empathetic, unconditional benevolence, whereas accountability imposes reciprocal obligations on the part of others* [Elisha 2008: 156]. (Jansen 2017: 73, emphasis added)

As the representational figure of a nation shaken by such a large-scale tragedy as the Christchurch shootings, Ardern needs both the compassion and accountability described above as tools for handling the situation. Having been the chosen target of an outstandingly violent hate crime, for the Muslim community especially in New Zealand arises the question of how to belong to and feel at home in a place where this could happen. Furthermore, to all citizens of New Zealand and Christchurch in particular, security and safety are a pressing

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21 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ibjKhZYju08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ibjKhZYju08)
issue after the events of a terrorist attack in their own home. This virtual mortal fear imposes on Ardern the responsibility of reassuring the public and calming the national anxiety, while taking up consequences to actually ensure public safety. As a part of the national mourning ritual, this can “be defined as a context for affirmation, negotiation and contestation of social bonds and authority, and they can be seen as a vehicle for social groups, ideas and values to gain legitimacy” (Pantti & Sumiala 2009: 122, emphasis added). This justifies a code for affirmation of authority, which includes any mentioning of herself or public institutions (such as the police) as reliable and trustworthy, as well as any evidence of the situation being under control. This seems to be most relevant in the first press conferences which took place on the day of the attacks; even at point where Ardern herself did not have sufficient information, she said: “Please be assured, though, the police are actively managing the situation. Christchurch hospital is dedicated to treating those who are arriving at the hospital as we speak as well” (Sp.01: 6). As soon as she was briefed by the police in Wellington, she elaborated on the actions of police, security forces, and provisions stressing the effort and commitment of public institutions:

“The joint intelligence group has been deployed and police are pushing all of their resources into this situation. The defence force are currently transporting additional police staff to the region. Our national security threat level has been lifted from low to high. This, I want to assure people, is to ensure that all our agencies are responding in the most appropriate way. That includes at our borders. (...) I say again, there is heightened security; that is, of course, so we can assure people of their safety, and the police are working hard to ensure that people are able to move around their city safely.” (Sp.01-2: 10-14)

Later on, when the perpetrator was held in custody and most of the urgently necessary consequences of the attacks had been dealt with, she moves on to a less pragmatic level by saying that “here are many questions that need to be answered, and the assurance that I give you is that they will be” (Sp.03: 2). The other task that national leadership entails is that of representing the country's citizens and their collective identity as a nation, which, according to Reicher et al, is what enables leadership in the first place:

One aspect of this is particularly important for the ensuing argument. It is that where people share an identity and hence share values and priorities, it becomes possible for somebody (or some bodies) to represent what they have in common. In other words, shared identity makes leadership possible. (2005: 625, emphasis added)

Hence the code representational function gathers all sequences in which Ardern speaks on behalf of the country or any group or community, when she refers to herself as a leader or as a “pars pro toto”, that is, as a part representing a whole (e.g. Sp.03: 3). She does this with what has been described by New Zealanders and international press as “naturalness”22 or

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22 [https://www.forbes.com/sites/eglantinejamet/2019/05/16/jacinda-ardern-or-inclusive-leadership-exemplified/#45ea15c6384a](https://www.forbes.com/sites/eglantinejamet/2019/05/16/jacinda-ardern-or-inclusive-leadership-exemplified/#45ea15c6384a)
“compassionately-driven” – an example of this is the quote of hers that preceded this chapter, where she expresses the non-strategic character of her strategy. She makes it transparent to the citizens that she is playing a role, and not one that is popular: “One of the roles I never anticipated having, and hoped never to have, is to voice the grief of a nation” (Sp.03: 1). She gives some of the responsibility that comes with this back to the audience:

And so to each of us as we go from here, we have work to do, but do not leave the job of combating [sic] hate to the government alone. We each hold the power, in our words and in our actions, in our daily acts of kindness. Let that be the legacy of the 15th of March. To be the nation we believe ourselves to be. (Sp.04: 1)

At the same time, she makes a clear distinction between “we” (the government and citizens, including herself) and “you” (the citizens alone): “Violence, and extremism in all its forms, is not welcome here. And over the last two weeks we have shown that, you have shown that, in your actions” (Sp.04: 1). She hereby stands as a regular citizen, as a role model, as a leader and a victim at the same time, encouraging the population to follow her example of compassion and empathy, which is to her the aspect of “shared identity” mentioned above.

### 4.3 Motives and Goals of Ardern’s Strategy

As we have seen in Chapter 4.1 and discussed in Chapter 2.3, solidarity displayed or enacted by political figures usually serves a specific goal and can be interpreted under a utilitarian paradigm; despite Jacinda Ardern’s claimed intuitiveness, it can certainly be said – and, in fact, it needs to be said, as it builds one of the main presuppositions of this thesis – that she acted with a particular purpose in mind, that she had a strategy. This is not to deny her personal involvement and emotional investment in the attacks, but to underline that, being the head of a multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual democratic state that suffered such a severe attack, she had a very concrete problem to fix – she had an agenda. In this chapter, I want to define the outlines of this agenda more precisely, trying to find evidence for it in the text material and linking it to the concepts of citizenship and multiculturalism that are at work in the case of New Zealand.

#### 4.3.1 Citizenship and Nationalism

The concept of citizenship is a difficult one to grasp due to its multifaceted character and its many, partly nebulous definitions – as “made-up” and performative borders and nation-states are (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2012: 729), as “imagined” are the communities within them (Anderson 1983: 44), and, hence, as vague is the idea of their supposedly

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communal character. What is more, nationalism is an ideology of a spectrum as broad as "ranging from fascism to a moderate identification with a given country with no necessary negative assumptions about other nations" (O’Donnell 2007: 250). According to Jones, citizenship "describes a specific type of social bond between members of a community that is symbolic of material connections of culture, tradition, and geography" which "confers on an individual an array of rights and responsibilities" (1994: 256). A more constructivist view on the concept provide Oosterlynck et al, who wrote that "citizenship as a status is bound up with particular processes of community formation and (...) the making of national political communities" (2015: 7). Returning to the claim that Ardern used a strategy of solidarity in order to arrive at a certain aim, this process of community formation can be described as follows:

The link between citizenship and solidarity is maintained by initiating citizens into a cluster of interrelated knowledge claims: ‘knowledge about what a good citizen is; knowledge about what a good citizen needs to learn; and knowledge about how individuals can learn to become good citizens’ [Biesta 2011, 142]. (ibid: 7)

Following this line of thought, it could be argued that she tried to keep the people of New Zealand "good citizens" by reminding them constantly of the sacred centre they all shared and the responsibility that derived from this, reminding them of the knowledge about their values and the importance of living up to them especially after they were threatened to be shattered (see again Sp.01-2: 19-20). This could be seen as the answer to Jones’ question whether we will "need to move beyond the parameters of citizenship in the nation-state in order to reach the global solidarity around questions of (...) human rights" (Jones 1994: 269), and the answer is Yes.

In regard to the analysis of the text material, however, it is of even greater relevance to understand how group consciousness is generated: “Fundamentally, collective identities are talked into existence” (Hunt & Benford 2004: 445). I have therefore searched the material with the code of (re)build collective identity, looking at every sequence that implies the making or remaking of a "we" – quite literally. Because it is a purely text-based content analysis, any linguistic or rhetoric sign, however small, carries a meaning that can be linked to Ardern’s supposed agenda to reunify the nation as one cohesive collective. A run-through of her speeches proves that this is actually the case: Constituting already single words as coding units, the code (re)build collective identity is the most used throughout her speeches (see Figure 1). There are several aspects of her use of the word “we” that need to be looked at. First, she draws a clear contrast between “we/us” (New Zealand) and “you” (the perpetrator), as could already be seen in Sp.01-2: 19-22 (see pp. 14 & 18). This seems to be self-explanatory and reasonable. However, examining further the actual meaning of “we”, it
becomes more blurry. Who does she actually include in this ominous group that she calls "us"? Who is "we"?

As described in the introduction, this search for the constitution of "us" is actually a core question of this thesis as it is also a core topic of anthropology as a whole; whether the concept at hand is ethnicity, nationalism, kinship or any other context of group formation, the identity it tries to define is "(...) a notion only existing in a context of oppositions and relativities", as Tonkin et al (1989: 24) put it. For Thomas Hylland Eriksen, a group can only be constituted as a coherent identity if it positions itself in relation to others (1993: 35). But if we assume that no feeling of togetherness, whichever way framed, can stand in itself as an absolute feature, what impact does this have on the concrete political perception of a group's identity?

Especially in Sp.03, but also in other appearances it becomes clear that Ardern slips in and out of different groups that she is referring to; she often elaborates who she is talking about in each respective case: “We – New Zealand – we were not a target (...)” (Sp.01-2: 19), “we (...) as a nation” (Sp.03: 2, 3), "(...) we are a nation of 200 ethnicities, 160 languages (...)”. However, just as often it remains unclear: When she says in Sp.03 that "As a nation, we do remain on high alert (...) we are maintaining vigilance" (Sp.03: 2), the “we” that she means here is actually the government, the state and its public institutions. Later on, she seems to include every single person in the audience when she says: "(...) the responsibility we too must show as a nation, to confront racism (...) Every single one of us has the power to change that" (Sp.03: 3). But who is she referring to, for example, in the sentence: “And so to each of us as we go from here, we have work to do, but do not leave the job of combating hate to the government alone. We each hold the power, in our words and in our actions, in our daily acts of kindness” (Sp.03: 2-3)? Here, she is simultaneously in- and excluding herself from the group she is addressing. "We” are at the same time the government, including her and excluding the citizens, as well as her among the citizens, excluding the government. By stating that “we will remember the tears of our nation” (Sp.04: 2), and by referring to "our collective memories” (Sp.04: 1), she makes it clear that it is a tragedy of national impact, not just for the members of the Muslim community. But on the other hand, she says: “We cannot know your grief, but we can walk with you at every stage” (Sp.03: 1), excluding all Non-Muslims from the group of those affected. Also, in Sp.03 on page 3, she says: “And we are grateful to the global Muslim community who have stood with us, and we stand with them.” We cannot be sure if she includes the Muslim community of New Zealand into this "we" that is grateful, or if she places them inside the global Muslim community.

The small pronoun "we" is a very powerful, and, in this case useful word. As Ardern takes advantage of the flexibility that comes with its vagueness, she changes her own position in- or outside of the group she is talking into existence depending on the message.
she wants to convey; if she is appealing to the audience, addressing issues such as responsibility for taking consequences or showing care and empathy in order to stand together, she places herself among everyone else; if she is reassuring the audience of their safety, she stands above them as a leader. The same happens to every community addressed, imagined or not: the "we" stays flexible. This way, the audience can decide where to place themselves and, just like herself, slip in and out of her makings of collectiveness.

As aforementioned and stressed by Ardern tirelessly, New Zealand is a multicultural nation-state. In terms of citizenship, however, it has "(...) undergone many conceptual transitions in response to a shifting socio-political and economic context" (Humpage 2008: 256). If, as Oosterlynck et al state, solidarity is "accessed through citizenship rights linked to the formal membership of a territorially defined community" (2015: 8), New Zealand should, by Ardern’s definition, have a problem with solidarity and national pride or positive nationalism:

Ensuring constitutional recognition of multilevel nationhood (as Canada’s ‘three founding nations’ formula does) would not, alone, be enough to redress the limitations of liberal citizenship. Settler societies must also reconceptualise ‘solidarity’ to reflect and support these changes. New Zealand may also find this harder than other countries because it has long lacked a strong understanding of ‘national’ identity. (Humpage 2008: 257-58)

Therefore, Ardern’s speeches can be scanned for sequences in which she rhetorically unifies New Zealand as a nation-state and tries to strengthen a positive feeling of belonging to this nation (code: strengthen positive NZ nationalism). I have defined this as any sequence in which Ardern refers to New Zealand as a place worth living in, a place with positive features, or a bundle of values worth believing in and fighting for. Many of the direct victims were not born New Zealanders, but migrated or fled there in search of a better life. Instead of awkwardly avoiding this somewhat uneven aspect of national pride in its original sense – Eriksen, after all, stated that "a nationalist holds that political boundaries should be coterminous with cultural boundaries" (1993: 35) – Ardern embraces and reframes it. "They have chosen to make New Zealand their home and it is there home", she says (Sp.01: 2), stressing the conscious choice of people to move to this country because it is "the home of these victims":

For many, this may not have been the place they were born. In fact, for many, New Zealand was their choice. The place they actively came to, and committed themselves to. The place they were raising their families, where they were part of communities that they loved and who loved them. It was a place that many came to for its safety. A place where they were free to practice their culture and their religion. (Sp.01-2: 17-18)

Over the course of her appearances, she makes this point again and again, referring to New Zealand not so much as a country – with borders, values made up of one certain culture, and
a unified body of citizens – but as a place with open doors, welcoming those who bring the values mentioned in 4.1.2: “a home for those who share our values, refuge for those who need it” (Sp.01-2: 19). Again, she symbolically shuts those doors to anyone who rejects the values of openness, peacefulness, and diversity: “I have said many times (...) [w]e open our doors to others and say welcome. And the only thing that must change after the events of Friday is that this same door must close on all of those who espouse hate and fear” (Sp.03: 3). And she continues this argument later at the memorial service:

(...) even the ugliest of viruses can exist in places they are not welcome. Racism exists, but it is not welcome here. An assault on the freedom of any one of us who practices their faith or religion is not welcome here. Violence, and extremism in all its forms, is not welcome here. (Sp.04: 1)

Oosterlynck et al argue that even though “[p]roximity and emotional attachment to place continue to play a role in the development of community and solidarity”, this proximity is no longer that of homogeneous elements, but those diverse in culture and experience of identity (2015: 11). Jacinda Ardern, it can be said, changes the concept of nationalism from one relying on closedness and austerity to one that is as fluid and flexible as the backgrounds of people that make up the nation’s citizens. Multiculturalism being one of the core values of the country and one of its main collective identity markers, it even has its place in the national anthem, which Ardern, during the memorial service, takes as the aim to remember and strive to, placing a the celebration of diversity right inside one of the strongest universal symbols of national pride:

> Men of every creed and race,
> Gather here before Thy face,
> Asking Thee to bless this place
> God defend our free land
> From dissension, envy, hate (…)
> God defend New Zealand

(Sp.04: 2, emphasis added)

In this context, it is sensible to further explore the concept of multiculturalism in itself and its place and role in New Zealand’s identity making and Ardern’s use of it in her speeches.

**4.3.2 Multiculturalism**

The term of multiculturalism can be used as “a demographic description of a society”, it can refer to “an ideology on the part of individuals or government that ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious diversity should be celebrated”, to “particular policies or programs undertaken by governments or institutions” or to “a specific normative political theory that lays out principles for governing diverse societies” (Bloemraad et al 2008: 159). It is a
concept and term highly charged with emotions and ideology and has been part of countless heated discourses on national and international levels. While its defenders are convinced that it “epitomizes and promotes inclusive solidarity” (Banting & Kymlicka 2017: 41), critics have argued that it works against social cohesion (ibid: 41) or that it gives cultural distinctions more importance than a society can handle (Bloemraad et al 2008: 161). The other side of this argument argues that a “blind[ness] to cultural diversity” is impossible and can lead to “inequality in rights, belonging, and participation in the public sphere” (ibid: 160). O’Donnell says about this discourse that

[d]espite fundamental differences, both the human rights and nationalist perspectives typically argue that strong multiculturalism threatens social solidarity. (...) Human sameness is important as well as difference. In the human rights’ perspective, the reference point for what people have in common is the human species, whereas in the nationalist one the reference point for inclusion is usually (...) citizenship (O’Donnell 2007: 253)

In Ardern’s case, all of these perspectives are somewhat legitimate and applicable: While New Zealand in itself is already a country that is in fact demographically multicultural and distributes rights through policies and programs to all its inherent minorities (Humpage 2008: 252), the strategy of the prime minister after the attacks shows a high degree of mentioned celebrational ideology and the political theory leading her way of governing.

In Ardern’s ambition to strengthen her audience’s positive feelings towards her country as described in Chapter 4.3.1, she uses a lot of concepts that can be read along the lines of promoting multiculturalism: diversity, openness, refuge, humanity; However, the code of promoting multiculturalism in the end didn’t hold insofar as that it usually overlapped with at least one other code and never stood on its own. Therefore, after the first run-through, I have taken it out of the coding guideline and left the main category of multiculturalism only one subcategory: that of reincorporating the Muslim minority into the multicultural nation-state (reincorporate victim community).

While the concept of citizenship allows scholars to analyse “the extent to which immigrants and their descendants are incorporated into receiving societies” (Bloemraad et al 2008: 154), it is the governments of nation-states who essentially define this concept through shaping its formalities and thereby granting “differentiated access to participation and belonging”; this, of course, has “important consequences for immigrants’ incorporation and equality” (ibid: 154). In a way, all different parts of Jacinda Ardern’s approach to the country that she had to comfort and lead in a time of an existential ideological crisis that I have described up to now lead back to this one main aim: that of reincorporating the victims’, that is, the Muslim community back into the community of New Zealanders. As argued before, multicultural nationalism is “an oxymoron on traditional accounts of ethnic
nationalism” that may need “public recognition to ethnocultural diversity within a shared national identity and narrative”, and may be needed to ensure the equality of national identity versus ethnic identity (Banting & Kymlicka 2017: 20).

Ardern’s attempt to unify these two notions of identities at a moment where they are at risk to most profoundly exclude each other requires all of the mentioned parts of her strategy as well as one part that deserves a code of its own. Coded with reincorporate victim community are all sentences or segments that symbolise the victims and their community or the Muslim culture and religion in general inside New Zealand or as a part of it, hereby verbally reassuring them of their right and claim to “express their culture and identity as modes of participating and contributing to the national society” (ibid: 31). Several times, Jacinda Ardern refers to those “directly affected by this shooting” (Sp.01: 2) as “our Muslim community/communities” (Sp.03: 3, Sp.04: 1,2). The most prominent manifestation of this code, however, is the countlessly repeated, slogan-like statement: “They are us” (Sp. 01: 3, Sp.03: 01), made even clearer twice by the elaboration: “They were New Zealanders” (Sp.02: 1, Sp.03: 1), through which she positions the identity layer of belonging to “New Zealand” or “us” over the one of being Muslim. Mentioned already in the code segment of solidarity, this is the strongest possible image of the interrelatedness of two groups bound together by the challenging and multilayered ideas of nationality, citizenship, ethnicity, religion, and shared values as markers of collectivity or communality. At the same time, it points in two out of three words towards a distinction being made (They and us).

One could argue, however, that Ardern does not call this distinction into existence herself, but that it is revived through the Islamophobic and hateful ideology of the attacks, targeting not only New Zealand as a nation but also the minority with a Muslim belief inside that nation; Ardern merely refers to this separation in order to eliminate it by making clear there is no difference between the Muslim community in New Zealand, and New Zealand itself: “They are us.”

4.4 Aspects of Solidarity and Cohesion in Ardern’s Strategy

Following Mayring’s content structuring, I will now briefly cluster the subcategories described in detail in Chapters 4.1 to 4.3 and subsume them to their respective main categories. I will then relate the main aspects of Ardern’s solidary strategy which have emerged from the analysis back to the theoretical concepts from Chapter 2.

Over the course of the first and the second material run-through, several changes to the category system have been made. Four codes have been taken out of the category system after the revision of the extracted material, which I have made transparent in the summaries of the subcategories. At the end of the theme analysis, five main categories (in the following
in bold letters) are left to describe: Language/Linguistic/Wording Symbols, containing the use of Arabic and Māori as well as segments of condemnation and solidarity; Consequences, further divided into the rhetoric consequence of the perpetrator’s name ban and the focus on the victims; aspects of Mourning Rituals: arousing and addressing emotions, referring to the sacred centre of values, and working with narratives to build a new national myth out of the tragedy; Ardern’s formal coping mechanisms As a Leader to describe her affirmation of authority and the representational function entailed; and lastly, Citizenship and Multiculturalism serving as concepts for the higher purpose or goal of (re)building a collective identity and strengthening a positive nationalism in New Zealand. The interrelatedness and proximity of all these concepts throughout the five documents can be visually grasped in Figure 3, which shows the overlapping of codes through the strength of the line connecting them; the stronger the line, the more often two codes were used on one single segment.

To consolidate these five main categories under the coherent strategy which this thesis has tried to depict, it could be said, in conclusion of the analysis, that Jacinda Ardern consciously worked with the different layers of identity that were involved in the situation; that she managed to lay the identity marker of being New Zealander over the identity of being Muslim, and therefore, the national identity over that of the minority, without, however, implying that the nation in sum was more important than the minorities constituting it; this is depicted in the main category of Citizenship and Multiculturalism. Rather, she unified all communities in the audiences she was talking to – which were journalists and the public in general, members of the parliament, as well as the guests of the memorial service (all of these belonging to one or multiple of the identity groups she addressed) – under the banner of New Zealand not as a country, but as a symbol for values opposite of those legitimizing the shooting. This was made clear through what she said and did (depicted in the categories of Symbols and Consequences, which both
derive from the theoretical concept of *Symbolic Politics*), as well as by what she represented (as depicted in the category *As a Leader*) and in which frame she moved (summed up in the category of *Mourning Rituals*).

As difficult as it obviously is to formulate a simple statement summarizing all aspects of Jacinda Ardern’s way of dealing with the Christchurch shootings, as impossible is it to point out every way in which concepts of solidarity can be found in it without repeating the entire analysis. I will therefore merely link the applicable concepts from Chapter 2 to her case with a brief outline of the categories in which it was represented.

Durkheim’s group cohesion and collective consciousness can be related to Jacinda Ardern and New Zealand in general through several points of connection. For one, she lies an extreme focus on said values that are the centre of group cohesion, relying not on the sameness of her citizens, but on the pride of their difference. We remember what Durkheim thought about the relation of national and societal borders, that “society is not constituted (...) by the mass of individuals who comprise it, (...) but above all by the idea it has of itself” (Sohrabi 2019: 1291), and this idea is what the prime minister was narrating in her speeches – it is the centre of her stories. In this sense, New Zealand can, unsurprisingly, be defined as an example of organic, not mechanical solidarity, as stressing the importance of diversity would not have worked out as a strategy of solidarity for the latter. What is also remarkable is the relation to Durkheim’s examination of the treatment of crime in societies, insofar as that Ardern’s rhetoric give a clear exemplary answer to the question of what determines a crime, and what constitutes the punishment: Assuming that, like all cultural phenomena, crime is relative to society’s declared norms and values, and in Durkheim’s view also a functional and inextinguishable one (1977: 111ff.), and as the Christchurch shootings as a terrorist act had the function of attacking and shattering those exact values, Ardern’s focus on the narrative of the sacred centre, of love and openness and pride of diversity, seems even more conclusive. There is no detour from the deviant act as an indirect offence against the values of the country back to those values as an indirect indicator for the form of punishment; the values of New Zealand as a multicultural nation-state are both the target of the attack as well as the strategic core factor in the coping mechanism. Jacinda Ardern’s rigid way of shutting the perpetrator, his motives, his identity, and his ideology out of the country is a way of rejecting Durkheim’s notion of the crime as a natural, and, to some extent, healthy part of society exactly because this was not a “regular” crime, but a danger to what constitutes the social system as a whole, a danger to “the idea it has of itself”.

Struggle as the source of solidarity in the sense of Marx can be related to Ardern’s strategy in a more abstract way; the narrative of one united, diverse nation standing and grieving together can indeed be interpreted as a group becoming “a group for itself”. The
consciousness of what essentially makes out New Zealand and holds it together has, it could be argued, never been as prominent in the public discourse as in the aftermath of the Christchurch attacks, especially because since its independence, the country had to figure out its own strategy of “state nation-building where the ‘national’ was correlated with the state” (Humpage 2008: 252). Interestingly, this “core” of New Zealand, as described in Chapter 4.1.2, is essentially what Banting & Kamlycka called “civic” and “democratic” solidarity, including, as quoted before, “a commitment to living together in peace and the acceptance of (...) diverse ethnicities, languages and religions as legitimate members of the community, as (...) a part of ‘us’” (2017: 4) – which was Ardern’s precise wording. Meanwhile, the concrete consequences she drew can be described as their mentioned “redistributed solidarity”, including support for different groups (see p. 8).

In sum, Jacinda Ardern tried to show solidarity in that it is “an identification with a collectivity such that an individual feels as if a common cause and fate are shared” (Hunt & Benford 2004: 439), while overcoming the vertical structure of government versus citizens by placing herself – whenever it was appropriate – among the people instead of above them, and, to be more clear, among all the people, be it by wearing a hijab. Examining compassion and responsibility as two sides of solidarity, and two sides that Ardern equally showed, the critique of solidary acts between different groups as giving weight to the difference of the groups in the first place still remains valid:

Solidarity reflects motives of a political ideological nature. (...) The feelings of compassion are strong, but not so ‘strong’ as to overflow the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Responsibility has a more neutral, non-political overtone, reflecting a more rational, calculated attitude. At the same time, responsibility does not only involve protecting the victim of mass atrocities, but also includes accountability to the whole of ‘humanity’. (Jansen 2017: 77)

5. Reactions and Aftermath

To gain a thorough understanding of Jacinda Ardern’s strategy of solidarity as a political event, after thoroughly analysing what and how she did reacted to the Christchurch mosque shootings, it is necessary to also look at least shortly at the reactions she received for it. In the perception of the public, did she succeed in trying to reincorporate the Muslim community into the community of New Zealand, and did she manage to restore the communal feeling of social cohesion and unity? According to Hunt & Benford,

[a] growing body of research suggests that both solidarity and commitment not only need to be conceived and enacted; they must be felt. (...) The dialectic constituting process between commitment, solidarity, and collective identity – a reciprocal shaping and being shaped by –
is largely a matter of emotion work. Emotion work, which goes hand in hand with collective identity construction, is not a one-way street with only the movement participant making emotional investments. Rather, for solidarity and commitment to be realized, the impression that the collectivity is also emotionally invested must be conveyed. (2004: 446)

It became clear in the press reports after the attacks that the population of New Zealand collectively felt grief, bewilderment, and loathing. The question is if Ardern was able to turn this utterly negative set of invested emotions into a positive, comforting, and constructive one, reminding “each and every” New Zealander (Sp.04: 1) of his or her capability to contribute to a peaceful environment. By taking a look at only a few, exemplary reactions in the media, I will outline the general emotional and argumentative mindset of the public in New Zealand regarding Jacinda Ardern after March 2019, trying to understand both the main critique points as well as the most frequently mentioned praise.

Extending beyond Ardern’s veil wearing during the meeting with Islamic community leaders and victims’ relatives two days after the attacks without further comment, which was the starting point of the high level media attention, soon the internet was filled with articles, commented YouTube-videos, discussion forums and the like arguing not only about the appropriateness of a non-Muslim woman with a hijab but about Ardern’s style of leadership in general. The discussion forum Quora soon went from discussion topics such as “Should Jacinda Ardern have worn a hijab?” (R.01) on to “Was Jacinda Ardern’s reactions to the Christchurch shootings heroic?” (R.02) and even “Does New Zealand PM Jacinda Ardern deserve the Nobel Peace Prize?”

The emotions that Jacinda Ardern worked with in the aftermath of the attacks also turned, in part, against her, in a discussion of what the sacred centre of values actually meant to New Zealanders, especially regarding the veil; the question is to what extent these public discourses actually led to a reaffirmation of values, as Pantti & Sumiala describe:

A traditional approach to massmediated rituals has been that they promote a sense of social collectivism that legitimizes the existing social order and affirms common sacred values. Media scholars drawing on Van Gennep have shown that the coverage of a traumatic event in the media evolves in stages over time, mirroring social stages of meaning-making, from dealing with the loss to the assessment of cultural values and, finally, to the reaffirmation of group values [Dayan and Katz, 1992; Kitch, 2003]. (2009: 121)

As already stated, the element of Ardern’s strategy that was discussed the most, both positively and negatively, was her veil wearing. Opinions belonged to anyone in the population, be they Muslim, female, or neither of those; they reached from praise of her

integrity as a leader to far right conspiracy theories of the Islam taking over the nation. The two story lines most prevalent on the side of the critics were those of cultural appropriation and the feminist critique of the veil as a symbol of suppression. “She is the Prime Minister of N.Z. and elected to represent all people and did not need to appease overseas trading nations nor a very small minority of people in N.Z.”, writes a male teacher from New Zealand in April (R.01: 1). On the far right website Jihad Watch – and this is not a lonely opinion – a user called Frederick King refers to the supposedly missionary character of the Islam, commenting: “The maori [sic] religion would be wiped out by islamists.” (R.04: 4) Not a new argument of the right but interesting in the context of identity construction in a multicultural state, this person puts whichever identity is the least threatening to them as the most important one, in this case, the Māori identity over the Muslim one, framing multiculturalism more as a civil war than as peaceful coexistence. Another interesting argument – more differentiated, but also arguably radical – is made by an Imam from Australia:

The last lesson we learnt was that most Western leaders have no pride in their own religion, culture or traditions. You can show solidarity with us Muslims by adopting better security procedures, not embracing our religious practices. (...) Frankly, I think this is an insane way of showing solidarity. It is also confusing to me, and all thinking Muslims. Why can’t Western leaders show solidarity with us without completely sacrificing their religions, culture and traditions? You did not have to adopt our culture to show sympathy. This proved on [sic] thing: the authorities in New Zealand did not believe treating Muslim New Zealanders as New Zealanders was enough, they had to put their religious identity ahead of their actual citizenship; that is if you believe that the attack was against New Zealand as a country – which it was. (R.10: 1)

Meanwhile, female feminists of all backgrounds as well as the far right using the argument of feminism in favor of racism discussed the entailed string of sociocultural meanings attached to the veil itself. Usually the people uttering their concerns were content with Ardern’s strategy as a whole, but ambivalent to the symbolism of the veil, like this male first-aid officer commenting on Quora: “That makes the wearing of a hijab not a choice, but a tyrannical custom, violently enforced- and should we turn a blind eye to that? So, as a one off, fine, but let’s not romanticise a customary requirement which is brutally enforced in some countries” (R.01: 2). A collective of Muslim writers and activists from Canada wrote an open letter to Jacinda Ardern, stating that

no tragedy can justify ignoring universal values of equality and freedom. As citizens of Canada of Muslim faith and /or culture, we find it crucial to inform you of the disastrous fallout of the pseudo-religious parody that you exhibited along with women in your country, no doubt because of ignorance, and as a sign of solidarity, wearing an Islamist and not a Muslim veil. This veil symbolises the de-facto inferioritization of women. (R.05: 1)
However, especially after the New Zealand-wide action of solidarity including non-Muslim women wearing the veil on the 22nd of March as a sign of their compassion and empathy, Ardern’s hijab was described as merely a “sign of respect” (three times in R.14: 1, R.23: 1) or even as a “sign of aroha” (R.12: 1), taking up those Māori concepts that Ardern already intertwined with an Islamic context in her public appearances. For many, it was also an issue of visibility: “She didn’t push Islam to the margins and away from the cameras, but deliberately chose to bring it alongside her for the whole world to see” (R.11: 1). In a talk show transcript published on democracynow.org, Eva Nisa, a lecturer of religious studies in Wellington (NZ) and Muslim woman, says about herself and her community: “So, women, Muslim women, especially those who wear veil, they are visibly more recognizable as Muslims, so showing her support by wearing a veil, it means a lot for many Muslims here in New Zealand” (R.23: 2).

As for Ardern’s reactions to the attacks in general, the overall tone was more than positive. Nevertheless, there were voices accusing her of having used the period after the attacks merely seeking for attention from the media and “know[ing] exactly how to play the cameras”, in short, for being a hypocrite and an opportunist (R.01: 2). This is likely to derive from the conviction of some critics of the “human rights project” that its supporters are “impractical romantics”, while they themselves are realists, even though the notion humanity as a “powerful means of contributing to social solidarity in a diverse society” offers theoretical as well as practical and empirical arguments (O’Donnell 2007: 250). Even the very tangible consequences she Ardern drew, such as banning semi-automatic guns from New Zealand, were in part considered superfluous:

On the other hand, she banned semi-automatic guns just a week after the massacre. FYI, the last time gun-related homicide rate exceeded [sic] 0.5 per 100 000 people was in 1994. Unlike the United States, there has never been a problem with gun violence in NZ, so obviously Jacinda’s gun ban will have zero effect. You can see over and over again how she prefers feelings over facts. (R.02: 3)

Also in the section of her admirers, there seemed to be some tensions between those who wanted to award her with a Nobel Peace Price for the outstanding, noble character of her actions and those who considered it more of a pragmatic and merely appropriate way of dealing with a scary and painful situation: “It was powerful, sublime, muscular and unapologetic. It was an unprecedented gesture on a stage of such magnitude and more importantly, it was far more than mere symbolism or political bluster”, writes Khaled A Beydoun in Al Jazeera (R.11: 1). A user on Quora rejects this tone of enthusiasm, referring to her constant affirmation of authority as a more down-to-earth approach:

For one thing her response was very measured in her tone, she was projecting an aura of ‘Yes a bad thing happened, but I’m on top of the situation and everybody can calm down and
take a deep breath’, that’s hardly what I’d call a heroic stance, sensible yes, but not heroic. At the end of the day Ardern was simply an elected representative doing her job in extremely difficult circumstances. New Zealand is very fortunate in that she did her job so well when it really counted. (R.02: 2)

Several public personalities also expressed their admiration of Ardern’s way of reacting. The secretary general of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, said that “Ms. Ardern’s appeals and leadership (...) were extremely important in the context of the UN initiatives to fight hate speech, and to better support countries in the protection of holy sites” (R.13: 1). Yusuf Islam, formerly known as Cat Stevens, made a noteworthy distinction between us and them: “(...) that you did not leave us alone in our sadness. New Zealand responded in a way that none of us will ever forget – that let the world know who we really are” (R.17: 2). This is especially remarkable as a comment from Yusuf Islam who is neither born Muslim nor a New Zealander. On the other hand, Muslim and New Zealander Eva Nisa merely says:

We just need the love and support and also sympathy, because—the other thing is, I think New Zealanders, we are very shocked with this kind of thing, because this never happened before. I mean, Jacinda Arden mentioned this is an unprecedented tragedy, too. (...) I mean, most New Zealanders, we are very happy with the comments made by our prime minister, Jacinda Arden. The hashtag #UnityIsPower and “New Zealand is home for the migrants” always has been repeated a lot. (R.23: 2)

Also, it seems to depend on which community one identifies more with to constitute which community one calls "ours": While Ardern as head of New Zealand and as a Western woman talked about “our Muslim community”, All Black Sonny Williams, both Muslim and New Zealander, said at the memorial service: “I just want to say to our New Zealand community, from my heart, the response has been beautiful” (R.17: 2).

The largest positive impression on the public, after all, had Ardern’s focus on the victims, her focus on empathy and compassion and her immediate condemnation of the attacks as an act of hate and terror, as, among many others, the Spin Off reports:

Within 60 seconds of reaching the podium, Ardern defined the attack as an act of terrorism. Within a few seconds more, those words had travelled to social media, to local headlines and international media. No longer was it an act of violence, it was terrorism. Hate. Neither then, nor in the days to come, would Ardern invoke the language of fortress or retaliation, however. The emphasis remained firmly on unity, solidarity and inclusion (R.18: 1)

In sum, the premier seems to have made a positive impact on the public regarding compassion and empathy during times of human crisis. She managed to rise “love and loyalty to our families, partners, religions, and countries, hate and contempt for the ‘other’” (Flam 1999: 265), drawing resources exclusively from the positive side, the values of New Zealand, instead of insisting on an "eye for an eye"-strategy of hate and revenge.
In political terms, however, her actions seem to be caught up in the “struggle for (rather than mobilization of) identity that is more personal than collective” (Mcdonald 2002: 125). As “many claim that negative views vis-à-vis migrants and the general feeling of a ‘failure of multiculturalism’ have eroded feelings of community and solidarity [Barry 2001]” (Oosterlynck et al 2015: 8), it could be argued that what Jacinda Ardern stands for is still an extraordinary example of a communality that is not necessarily defined by its sameness in traditions, language, or looks, but rather in its shared values of treasuring its diversity and intranational difference.

6. Conclusion

Very certainly, the concept of identity is, in any case, a “field of tensions (...) linked to patterns of actions and conflict” (Mcdonald 2002: 111). Collective identity in particular is defined by Hunt & Benford as “a group of individuals with common interests, values, feelings, and goals exist in time and space beyond the here and now” (2004: 450), while solidarity deals with the degree of social cohesion in and between groups and explores the “individual-collectivity nexus” (ibid: 450).

In this thesis, I have used a micro-analytical approach to explore the tensions and interdependencies between collective identities, solidarity, and group cohesion and formation. I have depicted and interpreted the strategy of solidarity of New Zealand’s prime minister Jacinda Ardern after the greatest national tragedy the country had ever suffered. After the perpetrator, following a hateful and Islamophobic ideology, performed an act of terror seeking to tear the collective confidence of New Zealand apart by attacking just one minority of the nation in particular, it was Ardern’s task to reincorporate this minority into the larger population and especially restore the feeling of cohesion and national pride and safety of all citizens, with special focus on the Muslim community. Following a structuring theme analysis, I have argued that she did this by using certain rhetoric, symbolism, and concrete actions, both showing her personal empathy and assuring her capability of leading the country out of the crisis and laying emphasis on both the diversity and unity of New Zealand. To get a more holistic view of her impact on both a national and international level, I have briefly outlined the main discourses that circulated about her on the internet. This question indeed has potential for an entirely new thesis; in a next step of trying to understand the (re)making of social cohesion in New Zealand, it could be interesting to perform a thorough discourse analysis on the reactions in the media, on social platforms, news magazines, and discussion forums. Analysing which groups of people – which countries, languages, religions, or ethnicities tended to one discourse or another, how they
stand in relation to each other, and what this tells us about solidarity as a global concept and issue would be the extension of this thesis leaving the micro-level and turning towards the macro-sited questions of anthropology. It would also be worth to look into the actual impact and influence Ardern had on the population of New Zealand and their image of themselves as a nation, a few months later.

What came to light in the process of analysis are the complex and multi-layered scientific problems and their socio-political realities; the question of "what are we prepared to do for others whom we identify as our fellows, and whom do we identify as such?" (de Koning & de Jong 2017: 13) soon turns into the foregoing search for the content of the "we" that is asking. Ardern relied strongly on images of solidarity and compassion, but these can only function in a setting of multiple marked-off groups, which contrasts the national unity that was sought to be generated. I have argued that Ardern tried to overcome this discrepancy by bonding her audience via a sacred centre of values attached to the community of New Zealand, which are more or less independent of national borders or compilations of cultural practices, ethnicities and languages making up a tight definition of what New Zealand is. Rather, Ardern refers to the concept of humanity, to the human right of freely embracing one's religion, and this might be a legitimate and well working approach to solidarity in a globalised world of plural societies: "[t]he fact that human rights norms have delegitimized long-standing models of national solidarity suggests that political values can be powerful forces in modern society, and raises the possibility that these values can themselves provide the new basis for solidarity" (Banting & Kymlicka 2017: 15).

Jacinda Ardern told stories to her audience; she delivered a narrative of New Zealand coming out of the crisis even stronger, more united and more peaceful than before, and she drew on every single person's need and wish to belong to a community, to feel at home and at peace. Which also answers the question of "what motivates [people] (...) to bond with distant strangers": "[D]eeply held consensual beliefs of what it means to be human. That is, beliefs that are actively communicated to foster a collectively imagined transnational community of 'people' or 'humanity'" (Jansen 2017: 76).

To conclude, I believe that the central question touched in this thesis is that of the central process of making up and containing an integral "we". As Levitas writes, this term both expresses and constitutes a collective subject, and without recourse to this there is no possibility of collective action. We have to learn to say 'we' now in real solidarity, in celebration of difference (...) – and above all, as an assertion of collective agency committed to change. (1995: 10)
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ibjKhZGJu8
• Jacinda Ardern's full Christchurch speech: 'Let us be the nation we believe ourselves to be' (28 March 2019)  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YdGq3frFsRo, first accessed 28 September 2019
Appendix

Coding Guideline

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  01 First Press Conference before Police Briefing March 15, 5pm 47
  01-2 Live Wellington Press Conference (CBC) 15 March, 7pm 48
  02 First Press release PM statement – 17 March, 4pm 50
  03 First Ministerial Statement in Parliament 19 March 52
  04 speech at Christchurch memorial 29 March 55

Reactions (CD) – in the Back Cover
## Coding Guideline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbolic Politics</th>
<th>Category Label</th>
<th>Category Definition</th>
<th>Anchor Example(s)</th>
<th>Coding Rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Language/Linguistic/Wording Symbols</td>
<td>Use of Arabic</td>
<td>Speaking Arabic instead of English</td>
<td>&quot;As-salaam Alaikum&quot; (Sp.02: 1) \quad &quot;Ko tatou, tatou&quot; (e.g. Sp.04: 2)</td>
<td>At the time of the speeches, the perpetrator was not charged of an act of terrorism yet. which makes the term “terrorist” – at least then – a condemnation rather than a legally accurate term</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Use of Maori</td>
<td>Speaking Maori instead of English</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Condemnation</td>
<td>Words with a pejorative, judging character</td>
<td>“(...) the strongest possible condemnation of the ideology of the people who did this. You may have chosen us -- but we utterly reject and condemn you.” (Sp.01-2: 21-22)  \quad “horrors of terrorism” (Sp.03: 2) \quad “our darkest of days” (Sp.04: 1) \quad “the ugliest of viruses” (Sp.04: 1)</td>
<td>Images of solidarity, here, can be any metaphor of two or more groups standing together, building a unity, or help, support or friendship of a symbolic kind, but not juridical, financial or social help; no image of unity as a nation or one entity, either, because that belongs to the main category of citizenship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Images and metaphors of solidarity or solidary actions</td>
<td>“(...) opened their doors for all of us” (Sp.04: 1) \quad “they are us” (Sp.03: 1) \quad “we can walk with you” (Sp.03: 1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Focus on Victims/Name Ban</td>
<td>Concentrating on the victims instead of the perpetrator</td>
<td>&quot;Naeem Rashid, originally from Pakistan, died after rushing at the terrorist and trying to wrestle the gun from him.” (Sp.03: 1) \quad &quot;He is a terrorist. He is a criminal. He is an extremist. But he will, when I speak, be nameless.” (Sp.03:2)</td>
<td>Anytime that Ardern could mention the perpetrator’s name, but instead leaves him anonymous; anytime she goes into details or personal facts about victims or their relatives and their needs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Help / Money / Law</td>
<td>Addressing concrete changes in law, helping services such as hotlines, the affirmation of justice, etc.</td>
<td>“As I have already said our gun laws will change. Cabinet met yesterday and made in-principle decisions, 72 hours after the attack. Before we meet again next Monday, these decisions will be announced.” (Sp.03: 2)</td>
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<td>Everything that relates concretely to help (for the victims’ families, citizens, etc.) or judicial and financial consequences; not the remarks about police and security, though, because they don’t seem to be as much a concrete help as more of an affirmation of safety and therefore a reassurance in the authority/functionality of public institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mourning Rituals</td>
<td>Arouse/Address Emotions</td>
<td>Appealing to the audience’s emotional connections to the situation or expressing own feelings</td>
<td>“What words adequately express the pain and suffering of 50 men, women and children lost, and so many injured?” (Sp.02: 2)</td>
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<td>“Sacred Center” / NZ Values</td>
<td>Positive features and traits that are inherent to NZ (and that were attacked), examples of people acting in this spirit</td>
<td>“A traditional approach to mass mediated rituals has been that they promote a sense of social collectivism that legitimizes the existing social order and affirms common sacred values. Media scholars drawing on Van Gennep have shown that the coverage of a traumatic event in the media evolves in stages over time, mirroring social stages of meaning-making, from dealing with the loss to the” (Sp.04: 1)</td>
<td>“A traditional approach to mass mediated rituals has been that they promote a sense of social collectivism that legitimizes the existing social order and affirms common sacred values. Media scholars drawing on Van Gennep have shown that the coverage of a traumatic event in the media evolves in stages over time, mirroring social stages of meaning-making, from dealing with the loss to the” (Sp.04: 1)</td>
<td>Even if Ardern does not address the values each time as particularly New Zealandian, because she attaches them to individuals or groups that, as she made clear in the same speech, are a part of NZ, it still (or especially) counts for “NZ values”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
assessment of cultural values and, finally, to the reaffirmation of group values” (Dayan and Katz, 1992; Kitch, 2003, quoted in Pantti & Sumiala 2009: 121, emphasis added)

"Myth/Narrative" Making the attacks and the aftermath into a national tragic story, addressing the collective memory of the nation

„They were stories of bravery. They were stories of those who were born here, grew up here, or who had made New Zealand their home. Who had sought refuge, or sought a better life for themselves or their families. These stories, they now form part of our collective memories. They will remain with us forever. They are us.” (Sp.04: 1)

Citizenship & Multiculturalism (Re)build Collective Identity Addressing the audience and different communities as an entity, framing words such as “we”, “as a nation”, placing herself among the people

“We each hold the power, in our words and in our actions, in our daily acts of kindness. Let that be the legacy of the 15th of March. To be the nation we believe ourselves to be.” (Sp.04: 1)

“We are one.” (Sp.03: 3)

Might seem to have crosscuttings with the subcategories of “Citizenship”, however, is only coded when she clearly uses the rhetoric of a storyline or narrative that plays into NZ in the future, while the other two categories work without this specification

Strengthen Positive NZ Nationalism Referring to NZ explicitly as a nation in a positive way, referring to NZ as a place/space that is safe or positive

“Because we are not immune to the viruses of hate, of fear, of other. We never have been. But we can be the nation that discovers the cure.” (Sp.04: 1)

“Ours is a home that does not and cannot claim perfection. But we can strive to be true to the words embedded in our national anthem (...)” (Sp.04: 2)

“In a place that prides itself on being open, peaceful, diverse.” (Sp.03: 2)

The word “we”, as can also be seen in the word clouds, is one of her strongest rhetorical units, but of course only carries a meaning when used instead of another proverb or noun like “I” or “they” or “the nation”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reincorporate Muslim Minority into Multicultural Nation-State</th>
<th>Images or symbols of the victims and their community inside NZ, or of the Muslim culture or religion as a part of the rest of the country</th>
<th>“They were New Zealanders. They are us.” (Sp.03: 1) „we wish to provide every comfort we can to our Muslim community in this darkest of times.” (Sp.03: 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a Leader</td>
<td>Affirmation of Authority</td>
<td>Referring to herself and/or public institutions (eg Police) as responsible and reliable, evidence of having the situation under control</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representational Function</td>
<td>Referring to herself as a leader or as a “pars par toto”, be it good or bad</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Consolance, As a Woman, Promote Multiculturalism and Distribution of Rights* did not hold as categories and have therefore been deleted after the revision process.
Eidesstattliche Erklärung nach § 14,8 der Prüfungsordnung der Fakultät für Geisteswissenschaften für Studiengänge mit dem Abschluss Bachelor of Arts vom 3. Juli 2013

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